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afrIcan systems
case In afrIcan court on human 
and PeoPles’ rIghts challenges 
barrIer to IndIvIdual comPlaInants
In a case against the African Union 
currently pending before the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the 
Court is under pressure to clearly estab-
lish whether it has jurisdiction to hear 
cases brought by individual complain-
ants regardless of whether the challenged 
State Party or international organization 
has accepted the Court’s jurisdiction. 
In Atabong Denis Atemnkeng v. African 
Union, a Cameroonian employee of the 
African Union Commission seeks a decla-
ration that Article 34(6) of the Protocol to 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights is 
contrary to the Constitutive Act (the Act) 
of the African Union, and to Articles 2, 3, 
and 7 of the African Charter. Article 34(6) 
requires that a challenged State acknowl-
edge the Court’s jurisdiction before an indi-
vidual’s case can proceed against it under 
Article 5(3). Atemnkeng argues that this 
requirement is inconsistent with Articles 2, 
3, and 7, which guarantee equal enjoyment 
of the rights found in the Charter, equality 
before the law, and the right to have one’s 
cause heard, respectively.
If the Court upholds the validity of 
Article 34(6), the Court may effectively 
deny individuals the right to have their 
causes heard in violation of Article 7. 
While individuals can currently bring cases 
before the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, Atemnkeng alleges he 
was denied the justice he sought through 
the Commission. Furthermore, because 
Cameroon has not permitted the Court 
to receive individual complaints against 
it, Atemnkeng is barred from bringing 
a case against the country in the Court. 
Therefore, Atemnkeng has brought this 
case against the African Union (AU) to ask 
the Court to find Article 34(6) invalid, pro-
viding Atemnkeng, and other individuals, 
an alternative venue in which to receive jus-
tice for human rights violations by States.
The African Court issued an opinion 
in July 2012 in a case that also chal-
lenged the validity of Article 34(6). In 
Femi Falana v. African Union, the Court 
did not rule on the validity of 34(6) itself, 
but rather applied it to find that the Court 
lacked jurisdiction. The Court concluded 
that an individual complaint against the 
AU, a non-state entity that had not made 
a declaration pursuant to 34(6), was out-
side the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction. 
Additionally, the Court concluded that the 
AU cannot be sued in the Court because, 
while the AU has separate legal personal-
ity, it is not a party to the Protocol.
The dissent, however, did find that the 
African Union could be sued because in 
addition to being a separate legal entity, 
organs of the AU can request advisory 
opinions of the Court. The dissent argued 
that Article 34(6) is contrary to the Charter 
because the Protocol, under Article 66 of 
the Charter, is meant to supplement the 
Charter in protecting and promoting human 
rights, but 34(6) instead effectively prevents 
the Court from addressing human rights 
abuses. However, the dissent determined 
that the Court did not have the authority to 
declare the Article null and void.
In light of the Falana decision, it is 
still uncertain how the Court will decide 
Atemnkeng’s case. With two new judges on 
the Court, Ben Kioko and El Hadji Guissé, 
it is possible that a majority could agree 
with the dissent in Falana and find that 
Article 34(6) is contrary to the Charter and 
individual complainants cannot be barred 
under it. While Kioko and Guissé both 
replaced judges who sided with the major-
ity in Falana, the possibility of a change 
appears unlikely considering that Kioko, in 
his previous role as Legal Counsel for the 
African Union Commission, represented 
the AU in Falana.
At stake in Atemnkeng is a clear estab-
lishment of the Court’s jurisdiction and 
individual complainants’ ability to chal-
lenge human rights abuses in the Court. 
Individuals can currently bring cases to the 
Commission, but as Atemnkeng alleges, 
this avenue does not always provide justice 
for individuals. Unlike the Court’s rulings, 
decisions of the Commission are not bind-
ing, and while the Commission can rec-
ommend individual cases to the Court, 
bypassing Article 34(6), it is often slow to 
deal with cases causing individuals to wait 
years. Without a direct venue in which to 
address human rights abuses, individuals 
in the forty-nine states that have not made 
a declaration accepting jurisdiction under 
Article 34(6) do not have equal access to 
justice. Furthermore, if the Court decides 
that the AU cannot be sued because it is 
not a party to the Protocol, as the majority 
decided in Falana, stakeholders will not 
be able to hold the AU accountable for its 
actions or inaction in protecting and pro-
moting human rights.
ecowas communIty court of 
JustIce focuses on effectIve 
ImPlementatIon
In an effort to combat an estimated 
sixty percent noncompliance rate with 
the decisions of the Community Court of 
Justice (ECCJ), the adjudicatory body of 
the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), ECOWAS announced 
a new focus on effective implementa-
tion of ECCJ decisions for its new legal 
year, which began in September 2012. 
Individuals who seek redress for human 
rights violations in the ECCJ do not nec-
essarily receive justice with a final rul-
ing from the court; the State Party needs 
to take steps to carry out the decision. 
For example, in Musa Saidykhan v. The 
Gambia in 2010, the ECCJ ruled in favor 
of a tortured journalist, granting dam-
ages and finding violations of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(African Charter) under Article 5, prohibi-
tion against torture; Article 6, the right to 
personal liberty; and Article 7, the right 
to a fair trial. Gambia has yet to make the 
necessary declarations or pay restitution as 
ordered by the Court.
The Chief Registrar of the ECCJ, Tony 
Anene-Maido, credits the unwillingness 
of Member States to comply with ECCJ 
decisions as the source of the lack of 
confidence in the Court. Adding to the 
issue is the effect of noncompliance in 
other Subregional Economic Communities 
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(SECs), which adds to ECCJ Member 
States’ worries over the ECCJ’s effective-
ness. The Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) Tribunal was sus-
pended after Zimbabwe refused to comply 
with its decision that found Zimbabwe’s 
land reform program discriminatory in 
violation of the SADC Treaty. While the 
Tribunal is suspended, its previous decisions 
are also suspended. With this background 
demonstrating the possibility of a similar 
fate for other SECs, Member States have 
expressed doubt regarding the effectiveness 
of the ECCJ.
The work of the States in developing 
implementation mechanisms is a crucial 
element in the ECCJ’s ability to protect 
human rights in the region. Originally 
designed to interpret the ECOWAS 
Treaty and hear contentious cases brought 
by Member States and institutions on 
Community Law, the ECCJ now also hears 
cases brought by individuals on contentious 
issues, including human rights violations, 
since the passage of the 2005 Supplementary 
Protocol to the Treaty. The ECCJ applies 
international human rights treaties that 
have been ratified by the States Parties, 
including the African Charter, which all 
fifteen ECOWAS Member States have 
ratified. However, the ECCJ depends on 
national implementation mechanisms set 
up in accordance with Article 24 of the 
Supplementary Protocol. Three states have 
complied with Article 24: the Republic of 
Niger, Nigeria, and the Republic of Guinea. 
However, even those States with a national 
mechanism in place have not uniformly 
enforced all of the ECCJ’s decisions.
ECOWAS, as a SEC, overlaps with 
the jurisdiction of the African Union, the 
pan-African international organization that 
provides complainants alternative forums 
in which to bring their case. All ECOWAS 
States Parties are subject to the jurisdiction 
of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (the Commission), and nine 
of the fifteen ECOWAS Member States 
have ratified the protocol establishing the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (the Court). There are certain fac-
tors that may make the ECCJ a more favor-
able venue for an individual complainant. 
Individuals cannot bring their cases before 
the Court unless their State has agreed to 
its jurisdiction, and the Commission can be 
slow to hear complaints. Further, exhaus-
tion of local remedies is a requirement of 
the Court and the Commission but not the 
ECCJ. Finally, while the Commission and 
the Court implement the African Charter, 
the ECCJ implements the African Charter 
as well as other international human rights 
instruments ratified by the State involved.
The ongoing lack of implementation 
by State Parties makes the new focus on 
implementation crucial. Nigeria announced 
in June 2011 the new position of Minister 
of Justice as the national authority charged 
with implementation of ECCJ decisions, 
but Nigeria has yet to effectively utilize 
the mechanism. If Member States still 
do not implement ECCJ judgments, even 
with national implementation mechanisms 
in place, future complainants may not 
have the confidence to utilize the ECCJ. 
Furthermore, States that do not implement 
ECCJ decisions deny past complainants, 
like Musa Saidykhan, the remedies prom-
ised to them. Complainants can still turn to 
the Commission or the Court, but they may 
be effectively barred from those organs if 
their state has not accepted jurisdiction of 
the Court or their complaint is grounded in 
an international document other than the 
African Charter.
Brittany West, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human 
Rights Brief.
euroPean system
ecthr becomes the fIrst 
InternatIonal court to rule  
on cIa rendItIon Program
The Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on 
December 13, 2012, found Macedonia 
liable for Khaled El-Masri’s torture and 
other violations in a case connected to 
the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s 
(CIA) program of extraordinary rendition. 
In 2003, Macedonian intelligence agents 
apprehended and detained El-Masri before 
handing him over to the CIA, the Court 
found. Nine years later, in May 2012, 
El-Masri filed the complaint to the ECtHR 
alleging unlawful abduction and mistreat-
ment by the Macedonian Ministry of the 
Interior. The case, El-Masri v. The former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, marked 
the first time an international human rights 
court considered the merits of a claim 
related to the participation of a European 
state in the U.S.-led renditions program. 
The decision by the Grand Chamber 
of the ECtHR found Macedonia liable for 
violations of the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (ECHR) Article 3 (torture 
and inhuman or degrading treatment) for 
two counts, Article 5 (liberty and security), 
Article 8 (respect for private and family 
life), and Article 13 (effective remedy). 
More broadly, the decision added juris-
prudence on the scope and extent of state 
responsibility under the ECHR for involve-
ment in extraordinary renditions carried 
out by states not party to the Convention.
El-Masri, a German national of 
Lebanese descent, asserted in his petition 
that Macedonia held and interrogated 
him for twenty-three days before handing 
him over to the CIA for interrogation in 
Afghanistan concerning suspected links 
to al-Qaida. He claimed that the CIA 
detained him “incommunicado” with no 
communication to the outside for more 
than four months until setting him free in 
Albania after the CIA determined El-Masri 
had been confused with a similarly named 
terrorism suspect.
The Grand Chamber found Macedonia 
liable on all charges brought by El-Masri. 
The first count under Article 3 relates 
not just to his inhuman treatment during 
detention by the Macedonian government, 
but also for the further risk Macedonia put 
him under by releasing him to the CIA. 
The court significantly held the case was 
not just important for El-Masri but for 
other victims of similar crimes and found a 
second violation of Article 3 for the State’s 
failure to adequately investigate.
The ECtHR previously ruled in Osman 
v. United Kingdom, that a state is responsi-
ble when it “knew or ought to have known” 
that there was a real and immediate risk 
to rights protected by the ECHR, and 
the State failed to “take measures within 
the scope of [its] powers.” The ECtHR 
in El-Masri’s case likewise determined 
that Macedonia “knew or ought to have 
known” because the reports of the actions 
of the CIA, which the Court stated were 
manifestly contrary to the ECHR, were 
known at the time.
In addition to Article 3 violations, the 
Court found that El-Masri’s twenty-three-
day detention by Macedonian authorities 
along with his transfer to CIA agents vio-
lated his Article 5 ECHR right to liberty 
and security of person. Section 2 of Article 
5 allows only lawful arrest or detention, 
prohibiting secret and arbitrary detention 
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and disappearance. The Court found that 
he was outside the legal framework dur-
ing his detention, had no access to any 
court where he could challenge his deten-
tion, and it should have been clear to the 
Macedonian authorities that he faced a risk 
of violation of his rights by the CIA.
The Court also found that El-Masri 
had been denied respect for his private and 
family life during the time of his deten-
tion and that, in conjunction with all the 
other violations, there had been a viola-
tion of Article 13 because there had been 
no effective criminal investigation, which 
consequently also burdened his ability 
to seek civil remedies. Article 13 of the 
ECHR provides a right to effective remedy 
in national courts for violations of ECHR 
rights. The remedy required by Article 13 
must be effective in practice as well as in 
law, particularly in the sense that its exer-
cise must not be unjustifiably hindered by 
the acts or omissions of the authorities of 
the respondent state.
The Court’s decision was a significant 
finding on the legal remedies for the 
ECHR States Parties’ involvement in the 
U.S.-led renditions program. Despite any 
tension it might cause with the United 
States, the Court made clear its disapproval 
of State Party’s involvement with the CIA 
program and was especially critical of the 
lack of investigation because it hindered 
both other victims and what the Court 
considered the general public’s right to 
know what happened. In a complex case 
involving the “War on Terror” and deli-
cate interactions among nations, the Court 
found the rights of the individual must 
still be honored. Individuals have thus far 
struggled to bring successful challenges in 
U.S. courts or any other arena against the 
U.S. government, but the Court’s decision 
creates an option that, at least when ECHR 
States Parties are involved, there may be a 
viable option for legal challenges.
Italy’s embryo screenIng ban 
breached couPle’s rIght to PrIvacy
The European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) delivered its judgment in the 
bioethics case of Costa and Pavan v. Italy, 
holding the State responsible for violating 
Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) by prohibiting 
pre-natal diagnosis of genetic diseases. 
The ECtHR found in its August 10, 2012, 
decision that the Italian Law on Human 
Assisted Reproduction violated the right 
to privacy by creating inconsistent and dis-
proportionate interference in the applicants’ 
lives by denying them access to embryo 
screening but authorizing medically assisted 
termination of pregnancy when the fetus 
showed symptoms of the same disease.
With the help of in vitro fertilization 
and genetic screening, the applicants, both 
carriers of cystic fibrosis, wanted to avoid 
transmitting the disease to their offspring. 
Because the Italian law prohibits pre-
implantation diagnosis, their only option 
was to conceive and medically terminate it 
if the fetus tested positive for the disease. 
The couple argued that not being able 
to access genetic screening to select an 
embryo unaffected by the disease was a 
violation of Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR.
Article 8 of the ECHR offers general 
protection of a person’s private and family 
life, home, and correspondence against 
arbitrary interference by the State. Section 
2 of Article 8 specifies that public author-
ity cannot interfere with this right unless 
it “is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary . . . for the protection of health 
or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.” The Italian 
government did not dispute that the law fell 
within the scope of Article 8; however, it 
argued that the ban legitimately intervened 
to protect the health of mother and child, 
the doctor’s conscience, and the public 
interest to prevent eugenic selection.
In its ruling against Italy, the Court 
highlighted “the incoherence of the Italian 
legislative system that only bans the 
implantation of healthy embryos while 
allowing the abortion of fetuses with 
genetic conditions” and found the law 
disproportionate, in breach of Article 8 of 
the ECHR. The ruling is consistent with 
a previous decision by the Court in S.H. 
v. Austria upholding a law prohibiting in 
vitro fertilization, on the grounds that there 
was no European consensus to consider it 
a protected human right, but the decision 
allowed for an exception, as was found 
in the Costa and Pavan case, where the 
public interests do not outweigh the private 
ones. Also like in the S.H. case, the Court 
in Costa and Pavan declined to enter into 
bioethical issues and instead restated the 
importance of proportionality.
The Court found in 2007 that the right 
of a couple to make use of in vitro fertiliza-
tion to conceive a child can be protected 
by Article 8 as an expression of private 
and family life. The case concerned two 
Austrian couples who wanted to conceive 
a child through in vitro fertilization but 
where denied access by Austrian Law. 
Costa and Pavan v. Italy broadened the 
scope of private and family life provided 
protection under Article 8 by including 
the desire to have a child born healthy and 
without genetically transmissible diseases. 
By identifying the parents’ wish with their 
right to privacy, the Court projected the 
concept of Article 8 as a right of individual 
will in social order. Thus, the desire to 
have a child free from disease constitutes 
an aspect of the right to privacy granted 
by Article 8. The Court held the notion 
of “private life” to be a broad concept 
inclusive of the right to respect for one’s 
decision to have or not to have a child. 
Furthermore, the Court observed that the 
terms “child” and “embryo” must not 
be confused, opposing the government’s 
argument that the ban legitimately inter-
vened to protect the health of the child. 
Accordingly, to avoid any deviation in the 
field of eugenics and to protect the free-
dom of conscience of medical personnel, 
the term “child” would not apply.
The majority of European countries 
allow some form of in vitro fertilization to 
avoid the inheritance of genetic diseases. 
Twelve European countries have yet to 
establish laws regulating in vitro fertiliza-
tion. The Court’s decision in this case sets 
binding precedent for all Council of Europe 
members. Although the Court has taken 
a stand on the relevance of reproductive 
medicine to the protection of private and 
family life, it remains unclear how in vitro 
fertilization can or should be protected by 
the European Human Rights System.
Antonia Latsch, an L.L.M. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, is a staff writer for The 
Human Rights Brief
Inter-amerIcan system
venezuela seeks to wIthdraw  
from the Inter-amerIcan court  
of human rIghts
After months of speculation, Venezuela 
has taken a decisive move to cut ties 
with the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (IACtHR) by withdrawing from the 
American Convention on Human Rights 
(American Convention). On September 
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6, 2012, Venezuela formally notified the 
Secretary General of the Organization of 
American States (OAS) of its intent to with-
draw. Venezuelan officials have accused the 
Court of acting as a puppet to United States 
interests and of meddling with Venezuela’s 
national sovereignty. Recent decisions by 
both the IACtHR and the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) 
drew derision from Venezuela.
In July, Venezuelan President Hugo 
Chávez reiterated statements made a few 
months earlier that the country would with-
draw after the Court issued a decision 
in Díaz Peña v. Venezuela that required 
Venezuela provide compensation for the 
inhumane detention of Raúl José Díaz 
Peña. That same month, the Commission 
sent another case to the Court, Hermanos 
Landaeta Mejías v. Venezuela, citing 
Venezuela’s failure to comply with its rec-
ommendation that the alleged arbitrary 
detention and extrajudicial killings of 
the Mejías brothers be fully investigated. 
Through its reports, the Commission has 
expressed concern about political intoler-
ance, restriction of free speech, impunity 
for human rights violations, and has high-
lighted the Venezuelan government’s reluc-
tance to allow the Commission to conduct 
observation visits for the past ten years. 
Most recently, the IACHR urged Venezuela 
to investigate reports of a massacre of the 
Yanomami indigenous people last year by 
illegal Brazilian miners inside Venezuelan 
borders. One day later Venezuela formally 
notified the OAS of its intent to withdraw 
from the Convention.
The IACtHR provides the last recourse 
of judicial review in the Inter-American 
System for violations of human rights by 
states in the Americas region. In order to 
be bound by IACtHR decisions, a State 
must first ratify the American Convention 
and then, pursuant to Article 62 of the 
American Convention, declare that it rec-
ognizes the Court’s decisions as bind-
ing. Venezuela ratified the American 
Convention in 1977 and declared intent 
to be bound by the IACtHR’s jurisdiction 
in 1981. Once the Court’s jurisdiction 
has been recognized, only denouncing the 
entire American Convention can remove 
the State from the IACtHR’s reach. To 
denounce the American Convention and 
the Court’s jurisdiction, Article 78 of the 
Convention requires countries to submit 
official notification to the OAS of their 
withdrawal one year in advance. Thus, 
Venezuela is required to abide by the 
Court’s decisions until the staying period 
expires. During this time, the Court can 
continue to receive and hear cases, and 
any case pending at the end of the year will 
continue its proceedings.
Even after a State Party denounces the 
American Convention, the Commission 
can still monitor human rights in that 
country if the State is a party to the 
American Declaration on the Rights and 
Duties of Man. Under the current model, 
if Venezuela fails to comply with findings, 
the Commission retains the option to for-
ward a case to the Court to put additional 
pressure on a State that has failed to adhere 
to its human rights obligations. Moving 
forward, the Commission will be able to 
hear individual petitions against Venezuela 
for human rights abuses; however, there 
will no longer be a legally binding mecha-
nism to uphold decisions against it. The 
only way Venezuela could completely 
remove itself from the Inter-American 
Human Rights System would be to for-
mally withdraw from OAS membership; 
thus far Chávez has denied he will do this.
Venezuela’s decision elicited concern 
among human rights advocates, includ-
ing a regional coalition of civil society 
organizations that called on Venezuela to 
reconsider. In a joint statement they wrote, 
“The potential withdrawal of Venezuela 
would severely undermine the protection 
of human rights in this country, and would 
eliminate the last recourse to justice avail-
able to those who have suffered human 
rights abuses.” An additional concern is 
whether Venezuela’s actions may encour-
age other States to reconsider their own 
ratification of the Convention and the 
Court’s jurisdiction. Ecuador has also 
openly threatened withdrawal. To date, 
Trinidad and Tobago is the only State to 
ratify, and then completely withdraw from 
the Convention. Other countries, such as 
Peru, began the formal withdrawal process 
and then reversed the decision when a 
new administration took office. Whether 
Venezuela will reevaluate and uphold the 
importance of human rights bodies in the 
Americas remains to be seen. For the next 
year, the collective system remains intact.
human rIghts court hands 
another vIctory to IndIgenous  
and trIbal communItIes
From the Belo Monte dam in Brazil, 
the Yanacocha gold mine in Peru, and oil 
exploration activities in the Ecuadorian 
Amazon, the rights of indigenous and 
tribal peoples stand in sharp contrast 
with the often pro-development stances 
of national governments in the Americas 
that grant concessions and allow corpo-
rations to build, dig, and drill. In June 
2012, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (IACtHR) reaffirmed in Kichwa 
Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador 
that States must engage in prior consulta-
tion with indigenous communities before a 
project begins on their ancestral lands.
In the 1990s, Ecuador granted a con-
cession for oil exploration in Block 23 
of the Amazon to PetroEcuador, the state 
petroleum company, and CGC (Compañía 
General de Combustibles S.A.), an 
Argentinian oil company. The Kichwa 
community of Sarayaku, numbering 1,200 
people, whose territory covers two-thirds 
of Block 23, alleged that it was never con-
sulted and that the community continually 
opposed the oil-related activities.
Seeking redress for the lack of con-
sent, in 2003 the Sarayaku community 
submitted a petition to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). 
An important element of the complaint 
was the introduction of explosives on and 
below their land for seismic testing. The 
Commission requested provisional mea-
sures to protect the community, which the 
Court granted. When Ecuador failed to 
implement the measures, the Commission 
submitted the merits case to the IACtHR. 
For the first time in its history, the Court 
sent a delegation of representatives to the 
affected community in Sarayaku to gather 
additional information and held an in situ 
proceeding. Secretary for Legal Affairs 
of the Presidency of Ecuador, Dr. Alexis 
Mera, acknowledged full state responsibil-
ity for the lack of consultation and offered 
to compensate the Sarayaku community.
Ruling in favor of the Sarayaku, the 
Court cited violations by Ecuador of the 
American Convention on Human Rights 
(Convention). The Court pointed to viola-
tions of the right to prior consultation, the 
right to communal property, the right to 
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life, the right to humane treatment, and the 
right to an effective remedy. In its deci-
sion the Court cited International Labor 
Organization (ILO) Convention 169, 
which addresses the rights of indigenous 
and tribal peoples and to which Ecuador 
is a party. It also noted that Ecuador’s 
constitution recognizes the right to prior 
consultation and establishes that affected 
communities should share in earned prof-
its and receive compensation for cultural 
and environmental damages. The Court 
specified that consultation should occur 
prior to the project beginning, that the 
state must make a good faith effort to 
obtain consent, and that consultation pro-
cedures must be adequate and accessible 
to the particular community. In addition, 
the Court ruled that the required environ-
mental impact assessment in Sarayaku 
failed to gather input from the community, 
was not independent from the oil company, 
and failed to take into account social, 
spiritual, and cultural effects of oil activi-
ties on the Sarayaku. The Court ordered 
Ecuador to ensure the explosives, which 
are still underground and pose a potential 
threat to community members, are deac-
tivated. Additionally, the Court ordered 
that Ecuador legislate a clear law on con-
sent, pay damages to the community, and 
ensure effective consultation procedures. 
The Court was careful in saying that 
Sarayaku did not place an outright ban on 
development activities on indigenous land; 
rather, the decision focused on the lack of 
proper prior consultation and linked other 
violated rights to this lack of exchange 
with the community.
The Sarayaku decision came five years 
after another pro-indigenous and tribal 
rights decision by the Court in Saramaka 
People v. Suriname. In Saramaka, the 
Court considered whether a tribal or indig-
enous group was entitled to collective title 
of its property and, if so, whether the State 
must ensure it has the community’s consent 
before granting concessions to develop the 
natural resources located within its terri-
tory. The Court ruled that there is a strong 
link between a tribal or indigenous com-
munity and the land and natural resources 
that secure its survival. Thus, because the 
Saramaka people traditionally harvested 
and sold timber, a concession for log-
ging could not be granted to a third party 
until the community gave free, prior, and 
informed consent.
The two decisions are especially impor-
tant as governments throughout the region 
wrestle with a pro-development and invest-
ment agenda, and the rights of indig-
enous and tribal communities. Saramaka 
set a broad stage for indigenous rights and 
explicitly linked the impact of industry on 
a community’s rights, environment, cul-
tural wellbeing, and livelihood, thus requir-
ing prior consultation and consent from a 
community. In Sarayaku the Court’s opin-
ion rested on Saramaka, but focused on the 
lack of proper prior consultation. While 
both decisions give a boost to indigenous 
rights, their full effect is still unraveling in 
Ecuador and Suriname alike.
Jessica Alatorre, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human 
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